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How do the military, other government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the pri-vate sector cooperate with each other when they find 
themselves conducting mine action tasks typically considered 
the purview of each other’s sectors? 
As demonstrated in Iraq and elsewhere, armed conflicts 
rarely end in immediate peace. More broadly, conflict does 
not only concern direct violence between adversaries. It may 
involve anything from nonviolent forms of influence (i.e., soft 
power) to the use of proxy states or nonstate actors, who wage 
war against each other on behalf of other states (e.g., American 
and Russian use of proxy forces in Syria). These realities mean 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs will increasingly 
take place in a gray zone—that space between armed conflict 
and peace, in which military and civilian agencies must oper-
ate simultaneously.
In response to the complexity of an operational environ-
ment without clearly demarcated states of peace and war, the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) conceived what it 
calls the competition continuum; first put forward in the Joint 
Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) and then further 
developed in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19. In turn, the U.S. 
Army continues to refine Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 
as the future operating concept for employing its capabilities 
across the competition continuum, to support U.S. national 
security policy and goals. The HMA community, along with 
the broader stability and development communities, should 
understand these concepts and ideas, because the “competi-
tion” in the gray zone is not about delineating military and 
civilian roles. Rather, it is about military and civilian organiza-
tions finding appropriate circumstances in which to best em-
ploy their capabilities or to defer to others’ capabilities when 
needed. It behooves the international HMA community— 
military, government, NGO, and private sector—to develop 
methods of cooperation and collaboration that apply across 
the competition continuum. Despite recognizing the need 
for better civil-military integration, the DoD has not codified 
a doctrinal concept or idea for how to effectively collaborate 
with other government agencies, NGOs, or the private sector. 
However, the private sector and academics have created many 
models of partnership and collaboration continuums that can 
serve as an intellectual foundation for developing compli-
mentary efforts between civilian and military organizations. 
We should look to them as a starting point to improve gray-
zone cooperation in circumstances that force the military into 
overlapping its traditional mission space with those of other 
HMA operators.
According to editors of The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, “[t]he existential differences be-
tween conflict and post-conflict are becoming increasingly 
blurred.”1 The U.S. DoD has defined this space as “competi-
tion below armed conflict.” It may involve anything from non- 
violent forms of influence (e.g., cyberattacks, economic sanc-
tions, security assistance, etc.) to the use of proxy states or 
nonstate actors, who wage war against each other on behalf of 
other states. The situation in Mosul, Iraq, exemplifies a gray 
zone: though the Iraqi military retook Mosul, nonstate actors 
continued attacking the city with improvised explosive de-
vices (IEDs) and conventional munitions.2 Syria provides an 
even more complex example of a gray zone. Within the broad-
er Syrian conflict, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran 
are using proxy forces to advance their national interests in 
the region and disrupt their adversaries’ interests.3 As a result, 
there are limited military forces from these countries oper-
ating in Syria, certainly not enough to establish security and 
to begin stability operations akin to post-war efforts in Iraq 
or Afghanistan.4 These circumstances, highlighted by a lack 
of armed conflict between national militaries, pose “jurisdic-
tional” challenges to military forces, government agencies, 
and the civilian sector.
Such gray zones, in “limbo” between peace and armed con-
flict (or, “large-scale ground combat operations” in current 
U.S. Army parlance), are just enough at peace to dispatch non-
military HMA operations into them. However, there is still 
just enough war to keep military forces deployed in them as 
well. This may trigger an overlap among military forces and 
civilian aid organizations conducting mine action (or other 
stability operations) in the gray zone.
GRAY ZONE
HMA in the 
by Lt. Col. Shawn Kadlec [ 20th CBRNE Command ]
1
Kadlec: HMA in the Gray Zone
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2020
 THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION6
To better address different sectors’ overlapping efforts in that 
middle ground between war and peace, it is useful to examine 
the DoD’s JCIC, which describes the gray zone as comprising a 
“competition continuum – a flexible spectrum of strategic rela-
tions that range from cooperation to competition below armed 
conflict to armed conflict itself.”5 The U.S. Joint Staff’s JDN 
1-19 further describes the competition continuum as “endur-
ing competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, 
competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”6 
The competition continuum does not replace the artificial 
peace/war dichotomy of the past with an artificial trichotomy; 
nor does it envision distinct transition points between coop-
eration, competition, and armed conflict. Rather, it seeks to 
describe an environment in which the United States may si-
multaneously cooperate and compete with other interna-
tional actors. For example, the United States cooperates with 
China on anti-piracy operations while competing with China 
regarding freedom of navigation.6 Similarly, the DoD could 
find itself conducting HMA activities in cooperation with ad-
versarial states, or as a competitive response to counter ad-
versary influence in a country or region important to United 
States interests. Among competitors with the United States, 
China has a growing HMA program and international out-
reach (e.g., China recently donated mine-clearing equipment 
to Cambodia).7 In response, the United States could refo-
cus or increase spending on military and civilian HMA pro-
grams as part of a larger national and international strategy 
to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as an alternative to 
China’s Belt-Road Initiative.8 While the civilian HMA com-
munity already operates alongside military forces, competi-
tion below armed conflict will intensify the geopolitical role 
of HMA and of other facets of stability operations.
JDN 1-19 also provides a lexicon that defines the geopoliti-
cal goals and strategic objectives of military activities along 
the competition continuum. The three broad ideas of com-
petition—armed conflict, competition below armed conflict, 
and cooperation—also contain a range of military objec-
tives, which should mirror country-specific policy goals and 
whole-of-government efforts (see Figure 1). Importantly, JDN 
1-19 uses the DoD’s Law of War manual, which is based on na-
tional and international law, as a basis for defining the vari-
ous forms of armed conflict and lethal activities that span the 
continuum.6 Competition below armed conflict and cooper-
ation apply to the civilian-HMA community because this is 
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Figure 1. Depiction of the competition continuum and examples of friendly and adversary activities along the continuum. The black 
boxes enclose military objectives along the continuum.
Figure courtesy of Stephen Marr, Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald, Hiram Reynolds, and Hannah Smith.5
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where the lines between military and civilian HMA tasks blur 
in post-conflict and geopolitically contentious environments. 
These DoD terms, concepts, and definitions have implica-
tions for the international HMA community because the DoD 
will conduct its HMA activities under this construct and as-
sociated legal norms. Specifically, understanding DoD objec-
tives associated with the cooperation and competition below 
armed-conflict portions of the continuum will allow others 
to assess DoD’s commitment to country-specific HMA pro-
grams, and will enable cross-sector organizations to identify 
appropriate opportunities and methods for cooperation with 
DoD forces. 
Similarly, the Army’s MDO concept will affect the HMA 
community because MDO includes stability operations and 
HMA activities conducted by Army forces.9 Within the MDO 
concept, a return to competition provides an example of how 
the ideas within the Army’s MDO concept may affect civil-
ian HMA organizations: “In the return to competition [be-
low armed conflict], Army forces conduct three concurrent 
tasks: physically secure terrain and populations to produce 
sustainable outcomes; set conditions for long-term deterrence 
by regenerating partner and Army capacity; and adapt force 
posture to the new security environment.”10 To achieve these 
results though, military forces must also address armed con-
flict’s governmental, social, and economic disruptions in ad-
dition to the immediate security situation.6 HMA helps DoD 
to address these disruptions and to produce sustainable out-
comes through land clearance, securing weapons and mu-
nitions, and (re)generating partner-military capabilities and 
capacities needed for safer living environments.11 This af-
fects civilian HMA organizations because DoD’s HMA ac-
tivities can influence how the host-nation plans, prioritizes, 
and supports military and civilian HMA operations over the 
long term. As a result, military and civilian HMA entities may 
find themselves more and more intertwined—especially when 
military-led efforts transition to “whole of government” sta-
bilization efforts, led by the Department of State (DoS) or by 
other civilian agencies. 
How well the diplomatic, information, military, and eco-
nomic instruments of national power converge across the 
competition continuum will factor prominently during 
competition below armed conflict, especially during the 
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Figure 2. The linear battlefield is typically associated with large-scale ground-combat operations (e.g., World War 
II).12 Using World War II as a hypothetical example, HMA activities could have taken place throughout France, 
Belgium, etc. as the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas progressed into Germany.
Figure adapted from The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.13
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unstable periods immediately following armed conflict. The 
Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)—a joint report by the 
U.S. DoD and the U.S. DoS—assessed such convergence in 
several, recent post-conflict environments and identified how 
convergence may fail. The SAR recommends that the U.S. 
Government assign DoS as the lead federal agency for stabi-
lization, with the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the DoD as supporting elements, due “to the lack 
of institutionalized DoD mechanisms to enable regular collab-
oration with interagency and international partners.” However, 
as noted in the SAR, the U.S. Government places security re-
strictions on government civilians. This limits their ability to 
deploy to conflict and post-conflict zones.13 The potential in-
ability of DoS and USAID to establish a forward presence in 
conflict or post-conflict environments will, presumably, re-
quire the DoD to lead the convergence of U.S. Government 
capabilities with cross-sector HMA programs as part of the 
overall military effort during the early stages of stability oper-
ations in post-conflict environments. DoS will continue to be 
the lead federal agency for HMA programs and should assume 
responsibility once the security situation permits. However, it 
will likely have a military “face” in the immediate aftermath of 
large-scale, ground-combat operations. 
Figure 2 illustrates a linear battlefield common to large-scale, 
ground-combat operations (e.g., World War II), with the “close 
area” being the front line commonly referred to in Hollywood 
movies. The operational and strategic-support areas (i.e., the 
rear)—established once the front line has passed through an 
area—should be relatively secure and capable of hosting HMA 
activities. While typically not engaged in direct combat, these 
support areas remain active zones of military activity in which 
deep fires (e.g., long-range rockets or ballistic missiles), special 
operations forces (SOF), or nonstate actors (e.g., insurgents) 
will use explosive hazards to disrupt military sustainment and 
stability operations. Furthermore, the political, social, and eco-
nomic disruption caused by war “create conditions for intense 
competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking 
to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a 
new order.”6 Therefore, the security situation in these (loosely 
defined) post-conflict areas may prevent DoS or USAID per-
sonnel from assuming lead responsibility for implementing 
stabilization activities (including HMA). In these circum-
stances, the U.S. Army could opt to use a Security Force 
Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to partner with other security 
forces and use its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or engi-
neer personnel to provide HMA training to military forces or 
local civilians. If so, communication and cooperation between 
military forces and civilian HMA organizations would permit 
mutually-developed (or informed), military HMA programs 
to transfer to civilian authorities and organizations with min-
imal impact to the communities affected by explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW). 
Regrettably, the DoD does not have a doctrinal concept or 
idea for a partnership/cooperation continuum to facilitate 
this kind of communication and collaboration. However, ac-
ademics, business consultants, and others have written ex-
tensively on cross-sector partnerships and collaboration. 
Synthesizing various definitions and models creates a con-
tinuum of potential cross-sector, cooperative relationships 
(Figure 3). On the left, organizations can limit their coopera-
tion to simply exchanging knowledge and information with 
each other to achieve unity of understanding. On the right, 
organizations cede organizational autonomy to integrate 
as teams with comingled-resources, mutually-determined, 
and interdependent goals to achieve unity of command. 
Presumably, most NGO-military partnerships will lie to-
ward the left side of the continuum due to many NGOs’ ad-
herence to the four humanitarian principles of humanity, 
independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Conversely, U.S. 
Government efforts should converge toward unity of com-
mand.14 By operating on a partnership/cooperation con-
tinuum, disparate organizations can effectively address the 
myriad of challenges faced in the competitive gray zone, 
without sacrificing their organizational values and missions.
Partnership Continuum
Low Degree of Trust High Degree of Trust
Coordinating Collaborating Integrating
Limited Understanding Mutual Understanding Empathy
Independent Goals Mutually Supporting Goals Inter-dependent Goals
Separate and
Independent Resourcing
Synchronized, but
Separate Resourcing
Comingled and Inter-
dependent Resourcing
Networking
Unity of Understanding Unity of Effort Unity of Command
Figure 3. Synthesis of various concepts and definitions of “partnerships” and “collaboration.”
Figure courtesy of author.14
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Using a partnership continuum allows military and civil-
ian organizations to identify appropriate circumstances for 
communication and cooperation. Returning to the SFAB ex-
ample, early communication between its EOD forces and the 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) 
will establish the unity of effort between U.S. Government 
agencies necessary to effectively transfer HMA programs to 
civilian authorities once the security situation permits civil-
ians to enter the area. Furthermore, early communication with 
HMA NGOs identified by DoS will establish the civil-military 
relationships necessary for unity of understanding. When ap-
propriate, NGO input into U.S. Army SFAB-HMA activities 
will nudge the relationship toward unity of effort—thereby 
enabling a more effective military program with a smooth-
er transition to civil organizations. Once on the ground, ci-
vilian organizations must determine to what degree they will 
cooperate or collaborate with military or other government 
forces, especially when they encounter explosive hazards they 
are not trained or equipped to identify, render safe, or dispose 
of (e.g., certain types of IEDs or chemical munitions). If they 
choose not to train and equip themselves to do tasks typical-
ly associated with government forces, then to whom will they 
report hazards, and how will they cooperate with military or 
other government agencies in the area, if at all? Thinking of 
the civil-military HMA relationship as a continuum of op-
tions ranging from networking to integrating allows military 
and civilian organizations to better compete against explosive 
hazards (rather than against each other) in post-conflict (and 
other) environments, while simultaneously sustaining their 
organizational values and purposes. 
In the complex gray zones of post-conflict HMA, more ef-
fective operations require better communication and cooper-
ation between military and civilian organizations. Lingering 
violence often prevents an immediate civilian presence in 
support areas, where combatants’ use of improvised muni-
tions often means civilian HMA organizations are ill-pre-
pared to operate safely. On the other hand, military forces 
do not typically have the expertise or experience to address 
war’s political, social, and economic disruptions. These re-
alities require ongoing understanding and cooperation be-
tween military forces and civilian organizations. To achieve 
this, the U.S. DoD should further refine the JCIC, JDN 1-19, 
and the U.S. Army’s MDO concept by incorporating an idea 
for a range of techniques and processes with which it can 
better cooperate with civilian agencies and organizations. 
Civilian organizations should review military doctrine and 
ideas as well, because they may find the DoD’s gray zone con-
ceptualization useful. From there, they might also contem-
plate the proposed partnership continuum, so that they can 
better prepare themselves to operate just below the level of 
armed conflict in the murky gray zone of post-conflict en-
vironments and alongside the military forces operating in 
them. Collectively, we can achieve better long-term results 
using each other’s strengths at the right places and times to 
offset our respective weaknesses. After all, the competition in 
the gray zone of post-conflict environments is between those 
who would use explosive hazards to perpetuate instability 
and those who seek to solve war’s political, social, and eco-
nomic disruptions. 
See endnotes page 58
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the 20th CBRNE Command, 
U.S. Army, or U.S. Department of Defense.
Lt. Col. Shawn Kadlec
U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel
20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives 
(CBRNE) Command
Shawn Kadlec is a lieutenant colonel in 
the U.S. Army assigned to the 20th 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) 
Command. He is an EOD officer and 
former EOD battalion commander with 
combat experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As a battalion command-
er, his subordinate units conducted 
HMA and C-IED training across the 
Indo-Pacific region. Lt. Col. Kadlec is a graduate of the U.S. Army 
War College class of 2019. 
5
Kadlec: HMA in the Gray Zone
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2020
